

Nationalism and Fascination of the Design in the German Third Reich

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Abstract: Until today there are a lot of myths about the design in the German Third Reich. Although the Third Reich was what is called the Nationalsocialistic State, it was not a unitary ideological system. It has also never developed its own unitary style. Instead it connected in forms and contents seamlessly with a repertoire of various styles that were created in the Weimar Republic, in according to demand of its political and economical efficiency. Hence its design was developed into several levels. At that man counts *Volksempfänger*, *Volkswagen*, *Autobahn* and the Zeppelinfield in Nuremberg as the excellent design product for the Nationalsocialistic governance. At that time the most citizen had a strong desire to increase their own private Status, particularly a material wealth for the first time in the just opened consumer society. They had positive assessments of their reality of the life and optimistic visions of their future in the Nationalsocialistic State. The *Volksempfänger* conduced for them to a representative evidence medium as a pure consumer product. The *Volkswagen* conveyed certainly a vision of the future of the nationalsocialistic mobility life style. The *Autobahn* and the Zeppelinfield in Nuremberg afforded abetment to the Nationalsocialism of the crowd and distributed the emotion of the proud belonging together to a powerful nation. All those design products that had been developed into the nationalsocialistic myths, fascinated the great masses. The collective fascination mobilized the German citizen to establish the nationalsocialistic Idendtity and increase the notorious racialistic violence.

Key words: *Nationalism, white Socialism, Fascination, Wir-Gefühl, Gleichschaltung.*

1. Introduction

Many industrialized countries in the west that had been originated from the rise of Nationalism showed keen interest in technology and design to maintain their power structure [1]. To them, technology and design were effective tools to obtain power and to attract the general public, while silencing their opponents. In particular, a series of policies pursued by the National Socialists (hereafter Nazi) to encourage industrial development during the Third Reich in Germany is regarded as the best example of systematic program where technology and design contributed to acquisition and expansion of political power. However, a closer look at these policies reveals lack of consistency. One might also notice that various groups of people with varying interests and political agenda adopted the rhetoric of “Nation” or “*Führerwillen*(leader’s order)”, to challenge one another in the finely woven web of politics. In the case of design, a variety of styles co-existed. Regardless of the differing qualities of these designs, they collectively achieved the same ultimate objective by establishing dictatorship and building a firm support basis thereof, as though there had been a systematic guideline. How was it possible? As W.F. Haug

described, the aesthetic fascination of design enabled manipulation of individuals' minds[2]. In fact, as historical research on everyday of the Third Reich indicates, the majority of mass became fascist to participate in, or at least consent with silence, the National Socialist violence of the time[3].

2. Designs during the Third Reich in Germany

2.1 Socio-cultural background

Beginning from the mid-nineteenth century, there had been efforts for industrialization in the regions that cover present-day Germany, modeled after the United Kingdom and France, which resulted in the birth of the German *Kaiserreich*. Being made up of many autonomous independent states, however, the *Kaiserreich* had limitations to develop into a powerful nation-state like its British and French counterparts. Additionally, Nationalism was relatively weaker in Germany in comparison to that of neighboring countries. However, with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as the defeated nation following the World War I, the *Kaiserreich* suffered not only from loss of its colonies and territories by France and Poland, but also from tremendous sum of reparations. The resentment caused by the aftermath of the Treaty was widespread among the German public, resulting in the outburst of Nationalism. In particular, the German youths lost hope for the future, as they had to experience explosive inflation and massive unemployment as a result of the global economic crisis 1929. These young people became the main support basis for the extreme right Nationalism, causing a rapid growth of the NSDAP, who increasingly earned widespread support among the Germans. At two elections that took place in 1932, the NSDAP secured the majority of seats both times. On January 20, 1933, with the appointment of Hitler as the Chancellor of Germany, the Nazi came to power and founded the German Third Reich under the slogan, “*Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer* (one people, one empire, one leader)”.

2.2 Styles in the Third Reich

Designs that the Nazis promoted to publicize their political objectives seem incoherent and, at times, paradoxical with one another, as the Nazis selectively adopted designs from a variety of repertoires that had already been established during the Weimar period. Nonetheless, these designs uniformly played an instrumental role in the spread of Nazi ideology. Design trends that the Nazis officially approved are divided into the following three major styles according to their stylistic repertoires: First is the representative style, which were frequently used for government offices and public buildings; second one is the *Heimat*-style and it was primarily employed to reinforce the blood and soil ideology in the national communities. Lastly, the *Sachlichkeit*-style was applied to the commodities, emphasizing functionality and economic quality.

As the Nazis saw design as an instrument for persuasion by means of brainwash and edification, they made a clear distinction amongst varying kinds of buildings according to the political value that they perceive each building held. For instance, the official buildings adopted either Art Déco style or pseudo-Neoclassical style. The former was modified by Troost, which is reminiscent of luxurious ocean liner, while the latter was proposed by Speer. Speer's architectures are characterized by monumentality and use of columns with little sense of proportion, a character peculiar to the style. In contrast, factories and research institutes employed the *Neues Bauen* style, a style most commonly represented by the *Bauhaus*. The primary role of official architecture occupied by the party and government officials was to symbolize the new order established by the Nazi through monumental designs so that the general public might readily share sense of belonging to the regime and follow the lead of the party. Thus, as is shown in the design of Zeppelinfeld in Nuremberg, the grandeur created by the

use of form, scale and proportion overwhelmed the German public, thereby letting them perceive themselves as chosen by the leaders and furthermore take pride in their being a member of the German race. Having been developed by the group of right-wing capitalists and the designers from the *Deutscher Werkbund* under the blood and soil ideology, the newly emerged *Heimat*-style developed by challenging the existing *Neues Bauen* style[4]. As an epitome of the national style, the *Heimat*-style was utilized to heighten the sense of German superiority over other races and broaden the shared *Wir-Gefühl*(sense of solidarity) in conjunction with Nationalism[8]. However, in the case of individual households and public housing that were built to alleviate high demands of housing, the *Sachlichkeit*-style, which came out of the *Neues Bauen*, was predominantly used in consideration of the needs for mass production in economical way. The *Sachlichkeit*-design scheme often included motifs commonplace in German culture rendered in country style so as to offer feeling of friendliness to the ordinary citizens, while strengthening the feeling of homogeneity as the same race[5].

The Nazis officially renounced the *Neues Bauen* and Bauhaus style rebuking that these styles were intended for leftist. Despite their official position, the Nazis viewed *Sachlichkeit*-style as fitting for spread of the Nazis propaganda, as the *Sachlichkeit*-style not only possessed economic value that enabled mass production, but also represented progress, speed and future-oriented quality, all of which suited the Nazi ideology. Hence, members of the *Deutscher Werkbund* and the Bauhaus, who happened to be advocates of the *Neues Bauen*, were welcomed at the *Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur*, and these people subsequently joined the *Amt für Schönheit der Arbeit* [6]. Under the leadership of *Amt für Schönheit der Arbeit* in the realm of everyday commodity design, the taste of the general public was tuned in to the *Sachlichkeit*-style. The convenience and satisfaction offered by the consumption of these goods led the Germans to be all the more immersed in Nazi ideologies. Development of *Volksempfänger*, *Volkswagen* and *Autobahn* is the enterprise that the Nazis actively promoted as the apex of their national culture, which in turn contributed to reinforcement of the Nazi ideology among German people.

3. Volksempfänger

3.1 The Development of Volksempfänger

As the Nazis propagated: “The entire Germany listens to the *Führer* through *Volksempfänger*.” The Nazis considered radio as an important propaganda tool and thus invested highly in swift spread of radio from the early years of their regime so that their messages could be heard at any time. For this reason, the Nazis undertook development of low-cost radio receiver under the slogan of “radio receivers for every German household”. J. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda requested every radio manufacturer to collectively develop and produce low-cost radio set. Goebbels named the radio receiver *Volksempfänger*, as it was intended for the entire people who listened to this high-tech medium[7]. *Volksempfänger* was a triode medium frequency radio featuring standardized parts and was designed to exclusively receive local stations. Few foreign broadcasts were within its reception. Standardization, along with the low-cost manufacture approach allowed the launch of *Volksempfänger* at a great bargain price of 76 Marks, which was only half the price of existing low-cost radio sets of similar specification. Consequently, almost every household could afford *Volksempfänger* without too much financial burden. Moreover, distributors introduced a payment plan where consumers could deposit initial due of 7.50 Marks and pay the monthly payment of 4.40 Marks for the subsequent eighteen months. Beginning from May 25, 1933, the first 100,000 radio sets were produced. On August 18 of the same year, Goebbels announced the

launch of VE301 model at the International Radio Exhibition Berlin. VE301 was named to commemorate the date, January 30, 1933, when Hitler took office as Chancellor of Germany[7].

3.2 Innovations and designs from the Weimar period

Contrary to the Nazi propaganda that they were the first to develop *Volksempfänger*, the basics of design concept already came into being in the Weimar period as a part of the Worker's Radio Movement[8]. The movement aimed to mold class-conscious citizens by shaping public opinions under the motto of "Radios for All". Afterwards, with the rapid increase of listeners, many manufactures sought after development of inexpensive radio receivers. In 1930, Head Engineer Griessing of Dr. Seibt Company devised a triode medium frequency radio that would become prototype of Nazi *Volksempfänger*[7]. For the case design of VE301, W.M. Kersting's design of 1928 was adopted. Originally designed for communal radio case for domestic manufacturer, Kersting made this available to the public in 1932. The case design as well as measurement was highly standardized in order to meet the needs for mass production at low cost. As a result, this radio receiver design demonstrates functionality intrinsic to modern technology, while appealing to one's aesthetics through its production-oriented rationality. However, the extremely modern design of VE301 was not compatible with, if not in conflict with, the archaic and provincial styles prevalent in ordinary households during the Nazi era, as is aptly shown by Padua's painting "*Der Führer spricht* (1937)".



Figure.1 *Der Führer spricht*, P.M. Padua, 1937

3.3 Political and Socio-economical implication

In the 1930s, radio receivers were still perceived as expensive and high tech machinery. Thus, listening to radio in every ordinary household sounded like a dream. Not surprisingly *Volksempfänger* was a huge success, so much so that when the *Volksempfänger* hit the market at a price affordable to all, the entire stock was immediately sold out on the same day it came out[9]. In 1933 alone, more than 650,000 sets was manufactured, followed by 840,000 the next year. The most popular, hence successful, model was DKE 38, also known as Geobbles' Muzzle. First introduced in 1938, DKE 38 was sold for an exceptionally low price at 35 Marks. More than 22,000 sets were sold in October, and the next year sales recorded over 700,000. *Volksempfänger* sales steadily increased and the radio industry enjoyed unparalleled success. In 1939, over 12.5 million sets were sold and by 1941, 65% of household owned *Volksempfänger*[9]. The industries surrounding radio broadcasting thrived owing to *Volksempfänger*. Also, the success of *Volksempfänger* not only brought about the clear vision for the Nazi's consumption and leisure policy, but also enabled the Nazis to send their propaganda to the entire territory.

4. Volkswagen

4.1 Background of development of Volkswagen by the Nazi

The Nazis promoted the nation's motorization as being "*Führer's order*", and *Volkswagen* was publicized as "*Führer's gift*". The motorization ideology having been at the core of National Socialism from its inception, Hitler introduced four major policies on encouraging motorization at the Berlin Motor Show 1933[10].

As Hitler once acknowledged, the concept of *Volkswagen* could not have come into being without Ford's success story and America's successful motorization program. Indeed, Ford's Model T had a significant impact on development of its German counterpart, *Volkswagen*. Hitler was impressed and inspired by the ideology and thoughts shown in Henry Ford's book, *My Life and Work*. Ford was a self-claimed extreme right anti-Semite, and white Socialist[11, 12]. According to this book, Ford's ultimate ideals of "people's car" lies in the ability to manufacture cars at an affordable price so that cars could be purchased by thousands of people without financial burden on consumers' end, thereby contributing to ease of everyday life achieved through easy commute and entertainment[13]. Ford's emphasis on the social aspect of a car reflects a certain political intent. That is to re-direct consumers with a variety of interests to one desirable direction. This view to perceive cars as an instrument to achieve political agenda became the essence of propaganda for the *Volkswagen* project as well[14].

4.2 Development of Volkswagen in the Weimar period

In Germany, the concept of People's Car, *Volkswagen*, existed in discourses and experiments as early as 1904. Automobile motorization evolved to be a quest shared by anyone regardless of one's social status. The aspiration for automobile was one of the major cultural phenomena widespread during the Belle Epoque 1920s. As a result, the Germans made numerous attempts to develop and manufacture an affordable car that would allow mass production at a lower cost so as to achieve the public motorization as Ford's Model T did in the United States. Gaggenau first introduced a small car model Liliput in 1905 and called it "*Volkswagen*". The most successful version of *Volkswagen* in the 1920s was Hanomag's Kommissbrot, which was considered most innovative[15]. From 1921 onward, the term *Volkswagen* was used to indicate a small car - rather than referring to a specific model -, and the term also appeared in teenager's journal in 1927[11].

Despite a series of preceding examples of *Volkswagen* in Germany, Porsche has been credited as a sole inventor responsible for designing *Volkswagen*. Accordingly, he has been respected as a most influential person in automobile history along with K. Benz and G. Daimler. On the contrary, *Volkswagen* is a product that was developed by many engineers over the period of time. A number of engineers during the Weimar period proposed the use of compact rear engine so as to maximize interior space. Rear engine was regarded as an outstanding design approach at the time, and this technology was put to use well into the 1930s, evinced by Daimler-Benz's new small car Model 130 that featured the same technology[16]. Likewise, air cooled system, along with the uni-body chassis construction, was acclaimed as technology of the future in that these technologies enabled manufacturers to reduce the number of required parts, thereby simplifying manufacturing process. In addition, streamline carosserie, designed by E. Rumpler and P. Jaray, became a customary element by the 1930s. In particular, box engines were as light as the radial engines and, what is better, compatible with the air-cooled system so that even Porsche favored the box engine from the Weimar period[11]. Since 1922, Porsche, too, had been attempting to develop new engineering methods to manufacture small cars. His attempts resulted in as many as thirty prototypes by 1927 and 1928, although they were never been mass-produced. Soon afterwards, Porsche signed a contract with Zündapp-Werke to devise a compact car featuring four-seat-limousine with 2-

door, 1 ℓ engine and more than 12.5 km/ℓ in fuel efficiency[12]. Although Porsche was able to build three prototypes toward Porsche Type 12 equipped with air-cooled flat-four boxer engines, these prototypes did not go any further than that[12]. In 1933, Porsche once again developed the Type 32 for NSU, though it was not mass-produced. Instead, it later became an archetype for the Nazi *Volkswagen*[12].

4.3 From Volkswagen to KdF-Wagen

As an engineer who designed Hitler's favorite car, Mercedes Cabriolet, Porsche met with Hitler in March of 1933, when Porsche was offered to design a racing car to be manufactured by Audi for the occasion of German Grand Prix. In exchange, Porsche proposed his own plan to develop his version of *Volkswagen* to Hitler[12]. Based on this proposal, in June 1934 Hitler decided to invest in development of *Volkswagen* that would be available to the broader public for an affordable price of under 1000 Marks. By doing so, Hitler expected *Volkswagen* to undertake a leadership in German motorization. However, Hitler's vision for *Volkswagen* was far from developing an inexpensive compact car model. Rather, he focused on symbolizing superiority of German people: Hitler's *Volkswagen* had to be a sedan limousine with a capacity of four adults and a child. Furthermore, the *Volkswagen* was intended for long-distance driving at a maximum speed 100km/h with more than 12.5 km/ℓ in fuel efficiency[12]. As the government took leading responsibility of overseeing production and sales, the KdF under the DAF supervised investment, production and sales regarding *Volkeswagen*. As a result, *Volkswagen* was publicized as "*Geschenk des Führers*", along with Kdf-Tour, and KdF-Ships, all of which were intended for improvement of leisure. The newly developed *Volkswagen* was labelled *KdF-Wagen*. Although the official date to launch of *KdF-Wagen* was the end of 1939, the outbreak of war changed landscape of production centers: Only 650 *KdF-Wagen* were managed to be produced, whereas production of military vehicles such as *Kübelwagen* and *Swimmwagen* had been increased to over 50,000 and 1,4000 vehicles respectively[17]. Nonetheless, members of middle class signed up for *KdF-Wagen* so that the number of enrollment was over 170,000 in late 1939, and by 1944 the number reached over 340,000[17].

4.4 Political implication

The motorization of Germany was a major propaganda tool to strengthen Nazi's control over the people. Thus, the Nazis announced its pro-motorization policy shortly after their take-over, and actively spread the ideology that restriction equaled railway, while freedom equaled automobile: "Hitler said that the railway restricted individual's freedom of transportation ... People are looking forward to set free from the fixed routes of railways and strict time schedule of train rides ... Daimler and Benz are the ones that brought about revolution in transportation by challenging railroad transportation ... People discovered automobile as a new mode of transportation that will support their will without having to ignore their own decision to suit train schedules." [18] The Nazi publicists promoted that *Volkswagen* was an epitome of all Socialist endeavors that Germany invested in[19]. Thus, it was supposed to realize everyone's dream into reality. For this reason, Hitler in 1934 argued that with the development of automobile, no longer was there distinction among social classes. He also maintained that automobile should become a necessity rather than a luxury[19]. Hence, *Volkswagen* on the one hand served to relieve on-going conflicts between social classes. On the other hand, by allowing the laborers to become ordinary citizens, the introduction of *Volkswagen* was intended to divert people's attention from left-wing ideas of social class struggles to white Socialism[19]. In 1939, Goebbels stated: The Nazi was in pursuit of a grand project that would allow the entire German population to participate in its motorization. *Technik* should serve for improvement of a state. If *Technik* remains within reach of few privileged class of people, *Technik* becomes

dissociated with the rest of people and what is worse, turns into an enemy of people. However, when people voluntarily partake in *Technik*, *Technik* belongs to that people and in turn unites the people. This is why *Autobahn* should be constructed to allow people to run on it. This is why the entire German laborer should be able to own *Volkswagen* and this legitimacy is the essence of the *Volkswagen* project[19].

In this context, the Nazis pursued the *Volkswagen* program in a way that proved "*Sozial Technik*" that they used. The primary purpose was to improve standard of living and to popularize luxuries to the broader public and by doing so, the Nazis expected to expand their support basis. Thus, the priority of the whole program lay in manufacturing commodities at lower price by means of mass production technology. The first successful outcome was *Volksempfänger*. Based on public's desire for consumption that *Volksempfänger* stimulated, *Volkswagen* was used for political propaganda to create a myth of "*Führer's Victory*"[19]. Through this, the Nazis anticipated to engender sense of solidarity among the German people, while realizing people's dream to own a car. Without these propaganda geared toward the general public, as many as 340,000 people would not have enrolled to purchase *Volkswagen*. The slogan used for advertisement of *Volkswagen* enrollment was as follows: "To own your own car, save 5 Marks every week!" This phrase is reminiscent of Ford's slogan, "One dollar a day, one Ford after a year"[11].

5. Autobahn

5.1 Führer Adolf Hitler's Way

In the Third Reich, contemporaries labeled *Autobahn* as "*Führer Adolf Hitler's Way*". This phrase reflects the Nazi political intent to take advantage of the general masses' enthusiasm toward *Autobahn* in a way that was favorable to the state and Hitler's cabinet. Pro-Nazi media fabricated and spread numerous myths surrounding the construction of *Autobahn*, and partly due to these publicizing efforts, the construction project is regarded as a successful one even to this day[17]. Many researchers, too, agree that the *Autobahn* project resolved unemployment crisis of the time and provided instrumental momentum for the economic growth that followed[17].

The Nazi publicists attempted to spread a myth that Hitler was solely responsible for the inception of *Autobahn*, by saying that Hitler during his imprisonment in 1924 conceived the ingenious idea of highway network, which would connect the entire German territories. However, the concept of divided, intersection-less motorway dated back to prior to the World War I. In fact, America and Italy, among other countries, already saw the construction of modernized motorways in the 1920s. In fact, in 1921, AVUS constructed a motorway that connected Charlottenburg and Wannsee in Berlin for the first time in Germany. From 1924 and onward, STUFA conducted extensive survey on motorways and construction thereof, which led to establishment of HAFRABA. In 1927, STUFA proposed a design plan entitled *Autobahn*, though the plan was not to be realized due to lack of funding. The Cologne-Bonn route was an exception, as the area was densely populated and high in unemployment rate. With the unemployment subsidy, groundbreaking took place in 1929 and the first-ever *Autobahn* in Germany was completed with the laudatory remarks by the Mayor of Cologne, who said, "This is the motorway of the future." [17]

5.2 Development of the Autobahn

As most members of HAFRABA belonged to the Nazi Party, HAFRABA had a close connection with the Party. In particular, Todt, a loyalist and core member of the Nazi Party, had a keen interest in construction of motorway

since 1923. When Todt unfolded his plan to construct Autobahn to Hitler, Hitler embraced Todt’s idea, as Hitler also saw the potential of *Autobahn* in advertising his achievement in a short amount of time. Consequently, Hitler officially announced the launch of *Autobahn* construction program on May 1, 1933. He also incorporated HAFRABA into GEZUVOR to undertake the project and appointed Todt as Director to supervise the program. The construction project made a rapid progress. On September 23, 1933, the ground was broken for the Frankfurt route and by March 21, 1932, every planned route leading to Munich and Border was completed. In 1936, the construction of first 1,000 km was finished, and total of 3,000 km was completed in 1938. Until the construction was stopped as a result of the war, the completed distance reached 3,860 km. However, as J.F. Kennedy observed during his trip to Germany in 1937, *Autobahn* was empty, with little, if any, motor vehicles on it. [17, 20, 21]

5.3 Political implication

The motorization of Germany Thanks to the heightened desire for motorization in the Weimar period, the Nazi ideology focusing on the “national motorization” and “*Führer’s* way” swiftly spread throughout the country. When Hitler took office in 1933, the worldwide depression resulted in over 6 million unemployed workers in Germany. The Nazis accepted HAFRABA’s massive infrastructure construction project as their labor policy in the hope that it would serve to stimulate the economy as Roosevelt’s New Deal policy did. However, the *Autobahn* officially was Hitler’s idea to effectively address the unemployment crisis[22].




Figure.2 Often, the diagrams showing the reduction of unemployment rate was juxtaposed with the images of *Autobahn* workers so as to give audience an impression that *Autobahn* is responsible for reducing unemployment workforce.

On dismantling labor unions and founding DAF through so-called *Gleichschaltung* (making the same and bringing into line by totally national coordination) policy, Hitler stated that protection and preservation of national labor force was the supreme duty of a nation and that the opportunity to work for Hitler’s *Autobahn* construction was an extraordinary[54]. Hitler’s propaganda such as this convinced the Germans that *Autobahn* indeed was Hitler’s gift for the nation, which would put an end to unemployment and bring about development and peace to the fatherland. With regard to this, Goebbels stressed in the speech of groundbreaking of 1934: “A new war broke out to combat poverty and crisis ... Germany is in the forefront of the war against global economic crisis. Our systematic efforts to overcome unemployment will become a model for the world.” [23].

Unfortunately, the goal of creating jobs through construction was never attained. Todt in his report noted that they approached nowhere near their goal to generate at least 600,000 jobs, even though they minimized use of machinery for the first three years in order to create more jobs[17]. According to the report, 1,000 workers were employed in 1933 initially, followed by 85,000 and 115,000 workers in 1933 and 1935, respectively, and finally the number increased to 130,000 in 1936. In addition, 120,000 men were reported to engage in supporting

business, while another 150,000 men were employed for the construction of connecting local roads[21]. Despite the substandard employment on the construction site itself, the German economy was greatly benefited by this massive construction project. Not only road and bridge construction industry, but also all other areas of construction industry made unprecedented growth, while number of other industries indirectly and directly related were positively affected by the project. As a result, the unemployment reduced to less than 1.85 million, making the program look like a success[21].

6. Conclusions

It is As so far discussed, *Autobahn* gave a feeling of assurance to the Germans by resolving unemployment and provided sense of community as a member of great people through the blood and soil ideology. Those who belonged to the national community was usually the middle class or above, who experienced the material opulence in newly emerging consumer culture or those who aspired to climb up the social ladder to be a part of the consumer culture. Not only the Jews, but also some social groups like communists and homosexuals were designated by the Nazis as inappropriate for the society and these groups were dismissed as the “other”. In order to convert this consumer masses into their supporter, the Nazis devised many *Volk*-products other than *Volksempfänger* and *Volkswagen*. Such *Volk*-products include *Volkskühlschrank*(people’s refrigerator), *Volkswohnung*(people’s house),.etc. [24]. The previously destitute Germans were satisfied with the opulent life promised by these commodities, which in turn imbued them with the national pride to be a part of the great national community[24]. Additionally, various venues brought together the nation into one and led to extreme collective nationalism by stimulating *Wir-Gefühl* that originated from the national socialistic ideology, as is shown by the rally held at Zeppelinfeld in Nuremberg. In turn, this collective tendency was accompanied by the strong craving for powerful leader and national hero. As a result, masses fanatically hailed athletes and movie star as well as Hitler and his regime whom the Nazis publicized as national heroes[25, 26]. Therefore, the Nazi Party always recorded over 90% of approval rating in Germany, Austria and other German-speaking electoral districts. In light of this popularity, it may seem natural that the Nazi war criminals felt no sense of guilt in the Nuremberg Process in 1945[27].

In addition, with the strengthened sense of solidarity, dualism prevailed whereby making distinction between “we” and “other” or vice and virtue or right and wrong. As a reaction, people feared to be left behind from the community, while ambition for success became widespread by admiring those who seemed more powerful, high in social rank, and respected[25]. This very fear to fall behind powerfully attracted people to extreme collective nationalism. Furthermore, it drove people to resort to, or at least silently yield to, violence against those who were determined as the other[25].

The movie *Feuerzangenbowle* is a classic Christmas film in German-speaking cultures and reflects the lifestyle of the 1930s. However, photographs of Hitler, Nazi symbols or the accent peculiar to Nazi could not be found in any of the scene in the movie. Instead, this movie is focused on portraying the daily life of the contemporary society resulting from consumption of goods. More generally, this movie is a metaphor of competitive society, indicative of modernity. The Nazi sought after the American style consumption culture based on competition. In the 1930s’ Germany, national heroes were movie star, racer, soccer player and boxers. Designers also competed with each other in their daily life to fulfill their own interest. The loyal members like Troost, Speer, and Todt competed with each other in order to obtain power, while the purpose was individual achievement to people like

Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, and Porsche. Regardless of their motivation, these designers all proposed and develop their design in pursuit of “service to the state and nation”. This resembles what Ford suggested in his white socialism[6]. There were many other designers who strived to excel in their own right by working at the *Amt fuer Schoenheit der Arbeit*[6]. As a result, the design during the Nazi regime was extremely varied in style, although all of these varied designs were in accordance with the Nazi political intent. Seeing their daily lives that resembled what Padua’s painting depicted, people did not perceive stylistic conflict, nor contradiction. Instead, they grew their pride while witnessing official architecture rendered in pretentious and provincial architectural style. They also enjoyed opulence by using commodities rendered in modern design. Without this power of design, Nazi would not have received absolute support from the masses, nor Holocaust or any other conquest would have been possible.

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